Wartime Decisions: Why Europe Must Shift Its Industry to a Military Footing

Europe Has No Time Left for Debate. With the U.S. stepping back from its traditional role as guarantor of European security and global threats on the rise, industrial mobilization is no longer optional for Europe—it’s imperative. The continent must build its own defense capability, or face the consequences.

From Crisis to Turning Point: European Industry at a Crossroads

Just a few years ago, Europe’s industrial landscape—especially its automotive sector—was a pillar of economic stability. Germany, France, Italy, and the Czech Republic led the charge with exports built on cars, parts, and production technology. Today, that foundation is crumbling. Declining demand for combustion vehicles, the pressures of energy transition, semiconductor shortages, and fierce competition from Asia have all plunged the sector into deep structural trouble.

In Germany, car production in 2023 was over 20% lower than a decade earlier. Energy costs soared. Plants across France, Spain, and Italy cut output or shut down altogether. Tens of thousands of workers faced reduced hours or were reassigned to logistics roles.

This industrial slowdown poses a stark strategic question: What now for Europe’s manufacturing base? Will it wither under global pressures, or reinvent itself in a new strategic role?

Russia’s war on Ukraine has brought new urgency. With rising threats from the East, an urgent need for rearmament, and a growing focus on strategic autonomy, European governments and manufacturers are now looking to the defense sector. The same factories that once made SUVs are now being eyed as future arms plants.

Europe is at a fork in the road. Either it embraces its industry as a strategic asset in the face of geopolitical threats, or it squanders a chance to renew and repurpose its economy.

Clear Political Signals: Time to Mobilize

Donald Trump’s re-election in 2024 shook European capitals. While his earlier jabs at “obsolete NATO” were well known, his second term brought clarity: the U.S. would no longer bankroll Europe’s security. American priorities now lie with the Pacific and the China rivalry. The Atlantic anchor has loosened—perhaps even snapped.

In response, Europe acted swiftly. Within months, EU countries announced defense budget hikes, security strategy overhauls, and accelerated defense investments. Major players—Germany, France, Poland, Sweden, Italy—all pledged increased military spending by 2025.

The European Commission responded with lightning speed, activating tools like the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP), SAFE, and ReArm Europe to coordinate procurement, scale up production, and reduce dependence on external suppliers. In its “Readiness 2030” paper, the Commission was blunt:

“We must think like a continent at war—industry, budget, and technology must act as one.”

This shift is more than rhetoric. Strategic documents now reference “wartime readiness economies,” “civil-military interoperability,” and “industrial crisis buffers.” Europe is no longer discussing reforms—it’s mobilizing.

And industry, long relegated to the background, now stands on the front line—literally and figuratively.

Tanks Instead of Cars: Repurposing Civilian Factories

Europe’s automotive sector is in its deepest slump in decades. Falling demand for combustion vehicles, high energy costs, climate policy pressures, and overinvestment have left many plants in Germany, France, and Spain idle. Meanwhile, cheap electric cars from China threaten to swamp the European market.

Trump’s return and his protectionist policies are already shifting Chinese exports toward Europe. Brussels warns of a “tsunami of cheap goods” that could break the spine of European car manufacturing. Factories that once competed with Western peers must now confront state-subsidized overproduction from Asia.

Instead of watching a cornerstone of its economy collapse, Europe is now rethinking its industrial capacity. Converting car factories for defense use is no longer controversial—it’s becoming an economic and political priority.

Germany’s Economy Minister Robert Habeck has acknowledged government plans to support automotive plant conversions. Rheinmetall is already repurposing former automotive sites to produce ammunition. France and Italy are also in talks with private firms to adapt parts suppliers for military production.

Transformation isn’t simple. It takes time, certification, and the right technologies. But the infrastructure, logistics, and workforce already exist. Ukraine has shown that even repair shops can rapidly pivot to producing drone components, radar systems, or armor plating.

Europe has a choice: let its automotive industry fall to China, or give it new purpose as the backbone of a next-generation defense sector. Some decisions have already been made. Now it’s time for execution.

Supply Chains and Scale: Can Europe Deliver Mass Production?

Political will is rising, but can Europe’s industry actually shift to war-scale production? Big ambitions—even with billion-euro budgets—run into hard constraints: fragmented supply chains, component shortages, and limited production capacity.

EU reports like “Defence in Numbers” and the “Growth Plan for the European Defence Industry” make it clear: Europe isn’t yet ready for prolonged high-intensity conflict. Projected output for 155mm ammunition in 2025 is 1.4 million rounds per year. Experts say Ukraine alone needs much more.

Tanks, drones, air defense systems—all demand complex, multi-stage supply chains that can’t be conjured overnight.

Fragmentation is another challenge. Europe has over 2,000 defense-sector firms—mostly small and medium-sized, operating locally. There’s no common interoperability system, no unified logistics, no shared parts platforms. A defense order placed in France might be delayed due to missing components from Czechia or machinery from Italy.

Human capital is a bottleneck too. Europe dismantled much of its heavy arms manufacturing over decades, and skills in CNC machining, precision mechanics, and military automation have faded. Now, thousands of engineers, CNC operators, technologists, and fitters are needed. But these skills can’t be willed into existence overnight.

Then there’s equipment. Specialized machinery for ammunition, radar, hulls, and precision systems is expensive, with delivery times stretching into years. Without rapid investment in automation and machine parks, “war mode” will remain a slogan.

Europe has the knowledge and facilities—but to operate at the pace and scale the geopolitical moment demands, it must move faster, together, and with resolve. Decades of peace taught us cost-efficiency. Now we must learn strategic efficiency.

The Invisible Foundation: Precision Engineering Behind the Scenes

Behind every optical head, targeting system, drone, or missile lies something invisible to satellite imagery or media briefings: hundreds of precision-engineered mechanical components. Without them, advanced weapons systems simply don’t function.

In today’s battlefield reality, the precision parts manufacturing has become both a bottleneck and a strategic advantage.

The EU’s industrial mobilization plans—like the “Growth Plan for the European Defence Industry”—emphasize rebuilding high-precision mechanical competencies. Modern warfare demands huge volumes of tightly toleranced metal components. Without them, there are no drone swarms, laser weapons, or missile defense systems.

In this equation, CNC turning is critical. Especially Swiss-type automatics, which enable the serial production of ultra-small, complex turned parts with repeatable precision. These are the parts that go into sensor cores, tactical suspension systems, and ignition mechanisms.

Europe has a long-overlooked edge here: its legacy of precision engineering from watchmaking and micro-mechanics. For decades, Alpine workshops in Switzerland, France, and northern Italy have honed techniques that may now prove pivotal for European self-defense.

Today, efficient production of precision parts for military applications is not just a matter of competitive advantage, it is a matter of operational security. If Europe hopes to meet the scale demanded by today’s threats, it must build on this invisible foundation of accuracy, reliability, and serial readiness.

Industry or Illusion: Will Europe Seize the Moment?

Europe stands at the crossroads of two worlds: the collapsing old order of security, and a new one—brutal, unstable, and self-reliant. The means are there. The technologies are ready. The lessons—from the front and from Europe’s own mistakes—are clear. What’s running short is time.

Ukraine’s war, tensions in the Indo-Pacific, and decisions out of Washington have left no doubt: Europe’s strategic window is open, but not for long. Mass-producing advanced weapons can’t be done overnight. Building the capacity to do so requires decisions now, to bear fruit two or three years down the line.

The question is no longer “Can we afford it?” It’s “Can we act in time?”

Europe has the people, the machines, and the know-how. It even has underused capacity in shrinking sectors like automotive. But it no longer has the luxury of gradual evolution. What it needs is a leap—in budgets, in regulation, in industrial organization, and in technology.

This is the moment when politics must meet production, and declarations must become delivery. If Europe wants to be more than a market and a donor, it must prove it can build, manufacture, and secure itself.

It won’t be paper that ensures Europe survives the next crisis. It will be industry. Time to stop talking about potential. Time to activate it.